

619 The name also includes various peasant
 • [563] groups and individuals who migrated from the Nile valley and who were
 incorporated into the tribal organization by a system of tribal adop-
 tion called "Iktitab." Most of these peasant groups came to the desert
 [701] to avoid military drafting by becoming part of Awlad Ali, who, until
 [554] 1947, were exempted from serving in the Egyptian army. Although groups
 and individuals thus adopted become part of the pedigrees of the adopt-
 ing tribal segments and are supposed to enjoy equal status, yet, insofar
 as their origin is still remembered, they are looked down upon by the
 Sa'adi and occupy a position somewhere between that of Awlad Ali Sa'adi
 and that of the Murabiteen.

619 The Sa'adi tribes consider themselves to be the descendants of a
 1973 certain Aqqar Ben Sa'ada or Aqqar El-Sherif, a descendant of Bani Suleim,
 who settled in Cyrenaica in the Fifth Century. Although they claim to
 [144] be of pure Arab ancestry, all sources agree that a considerable amount
 of mixture between Arab and indigenous Berber populations took place
 during the period they have been in North Africa.




Fig. 1. The Sa'adi Tribes

* The exact relationship of the Gemeiat tribe to the Sa'adi tribes is not exactly known. Many informants, as well as accounts of earlier travelers in the area, assert that descent from Hkadiga, a sister of Ali and Harb, and therefore are cousins of Awlad Ali. Others, especially members of Sa'adi tribes, themselves, deny any genealogical

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION


121
619 In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been 121
619 mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups
563 of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such 121
619 as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many [67] Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

There is no paramount chief of the tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms, Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.



613 Article 9:
675
539

The Amar should never fight on the side of the wrongdoer, because if it does, it will have to pay with him for his wrongdoings.

Article 10:

[E28] Any dispute or fight involving a member of the Amar and an outsider should be reported to the awaql in the Amar who are supposed to take the matter-up with the other party. If the awaql are convinced that the outsider is the aggressor or that he is at fault, they should try to make him accede to the demands of the members of the Amar, using all their efforts to convince him and the aquila of his bait. If he refuses, they [B19] should call him for a "Miad" (tribal meeting) in which all parties involved should be represented by their respective awaql.

Article 11:

• [563] With regard to "iktitab" (tribal adoption), an outsider wanting to [B19] join the Aggary Family or one of its constituent buite must be asked first about the reason or reasons for his desire to join. This must be done in order to know what kind of person he is and whether he will become a burden and liability to the Amar. If he proves to be of reputable standing, the aquila of the bait he wants to join can accept him without consultation with the rest of the awaql. If on the other hand he is found to have grudges against someone or if someone has a financial claim over him, then the aquila of the bait cannot accept him without consultation with the other awaql in the Amar. If all the awaql agree to accept him, he is considered like one of the Eilat Aggary, having the same rights and bearing the same responsibilities.

Article 12:

A member of the Amar who wants to separate himself from the Amar and get a "barawa" has to state his reasons before he can be released from the obligations of his membership in the amar. If his request to get the barawa was because of injustice he suffered by the Amar or any of its members, the awaql have the duty to straighten the injustice and restore his rights. If, on the other hand, his request for the barawa was to avoid paying the Amar, then he cannot be released from his membership unless he pays all of his share, or else he must return all that the Amar has paid him until the time he asked for the barawa.

Article 13:

[695] If one of the Amar is accused of an offense for which he is tried by [B93] the legal system of the state, the Amar as a whole share the expenses of hiring an attorney to defend him. This, however, is done after the awaql are sure (by means of administering the oath) that he is innocent and that the accusation is false.

613 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amara
671
675 find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.
682

613 Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount
672 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the re-
675 sponsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members
[693] of the Amar who are tried by the government (Article 13 of the Aggary
[695] papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of
613 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled
672 goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property
675 by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in-
439 come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a cor-
[434] porate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal
segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual respon-
sibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific
rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar
[675] papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed.
[131] Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dera'el Bahari, which
extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The
613 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed
• 563 mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adop-
619 tion. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are be-
lieved to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the
peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area
may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an
area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

613 This makes it possible for those adopted by the tribe to keep in touch
563 with their relatives and friends they left behind in the Delta while en-
619 joying the military exemption gained from their adoption by the Awlad Ali
population. It is also believed that Eilat Aggary, made up mostly of
peasants themselves, are very lenient in the conditions they put for
tribal adoption. Finally, the Eilat Aggary is not among the most power-
ful tribal segments of Awlad Ali, possibly because of their composition.
This assures the adopted peasant groups an equal status not normally ob-
tained if adopted by one of the powerful tribal segments of Awlad Ali.

613 The Amar paper of the Aggary explicitly states some of the basic
[675] characteristics of the Amar as a unit in the tribal organization of
Awlad Ali. The most distinctive aspect of the Eila or the Amar as a
political unit is the absence of any formalized leadership. Although
the Amar is viewed by outsiders as a corporate group as far as its legal
responsibility in certain cases, from the standpoint of its members, the
Amar is no more than the sum total of its constituent units or Baits.
This is shown in the Amar paper of Aggary which states that matters affect-
ing the Amar be decided upon by all the bait represented by their respec-
tive leaders, the awaqil. There is no formalized authority above the
613 awaqil, although one of the awaqil might acquire a position of informal
554 leadership by virtue of personal or other qualities. He will be con-
629 sidered as a mediator and go-between for the various leaders of the Baits.
In the case of the Aggary, Sheihk Selouma, the Aqila of Bait Eweida, has
acquired such a leadership among the Eilat Aggary. Although Shiehk
Selouma is relatively young, (he is about 40 years old), he has the re-
putation of getting things done. His Bait is the wealthiest in the

621 different principle from the principle of patrilineal succession charac-
613 teristic of the bait and all other units on the higher levels of tribal
segmentation.

Some of the camps I visited were composed of three patriline, while others contained individuals belonging to five patriline. In some camps each tent belonged to a different patriline, some of which did not even belong to the same bait. The composite nature of the camps is particularly clear in the case of what the people in the area called "nagei gheir aseil" or the artificial camp. This kind of camp is usually found near the towns and settled communities of the area. They include one or two tents of individuals belonging to the bait whose land the camp is built one, and who give the camp its name, but the rest of the tents are occupied by individuals from different baits or even tribes and also by

621 outsiders who came to work in the area. Such a camp does not act as a unit for any purpose. It has a rudimentary structure, and is held together by mere physical proximity of its members which stems from the need of "wanas" or togetherness. The composition of the artificial camps is highly changeable with new members joining and others leaving throughout the year. When I joined the camp of Ragi from the Sanagra tribe, it consisted of twelve tents. Four of the twelve tents were occupied by

• [563] Sheikh Ragi (two tents for the two wives) and his two married sons, five occupied by members of tribal segments other than Sanagrah, and four by workers who came from Alexandria to work for the government project in the area. One week after I joined the camp another tent was added to

[53] the camp. It belonged to a man from the Geneishat tribe of the Natruh area. He came with his wife to work on the new irrigation project which

621 had started in the area at that time. No special permission was re-
 563 quired for the newcomer to join the camp. He only got the permission
 of the person whose tent was at the far end of the camp to put his tent
 [574] next to it. The first night after the man joined the camp, his next
 door neighbor slaughtered a goat in honor of the new member and invited
 all members of the camp.

621 Leaving the camp also does not require any permission, although the
 622 custom specifies that before one leaves he should inform either his
 [576] neighbor or the headman of his time of departure. With the exception of
 [613] cases where the headman of a particular camp is at the same time the
 Aqila of the bait, the headman of the camp has no authority over the mem-
 622 bers of the camp. He is usually called upon to solve minor problems be-
 627 tween brothers or husband and wife, or give his opinion in decisions of
 minor importance. "A headman is like a father," said one informant, "we
 call him kabir el-nagi (the old man of the camp)." When a member of the
 627 nagei is involved in a serious dispute with another, the one to handle
 613 the case is the aqila or awaqil to whom the two disputing parties belong.

	<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Identifying aspects</u>
619 Group		
613 Kabila	None	Client groups attached.
621 Ella	None	Vengeance group, Vaguely defined tribal land ("watan").
Bait	Aqila	Corporate land-holding. Formally recognized leadership.
[622] Nagei	Headman	Residential unit with unsegmented structure.

ITALIAN RULE AND COLONIZATION

205

lodges. The Italians, who had some small schools in Libya even before 1911, gave considerable attention to educational matters from the earliest days of their occupation. The first educational programme for Libya, drawn up by the Arabist C. A. Nallino, was not accepted by the Central Government because it was felt that the proposals did not give the Administration effective control over the schools and that consequently education could not be sufficiently directed to political ends. Military conquest must be consolidated by moral conquest. This feeling hardened under the Fascists into an educational policy designed to meet the new programme of colonization. Mixed schools and classes were abolished in favour of schools for Italian boys and schools for Arab boys or, where they had to be taught in the same building, separate classes for each. Teaching, except of the Koran to the most junior pupils, was entirely in the hands of Italians. In the curriculum Italian took precedence over Arabic and it was intended that it should become eventually the sole medium of instruction. Arab boys learnt under the system to write Italian with greater facility than their own language. The aims of this education were to satisfy the cultural ambition of the Arabs, while keeping them under control and preventing them from reaching a level of cultural equality with the Italians, and to provide minor government officials and a means of inter-communication by which the Arabs could more easily be employed in menial work.¹ It seems that by 1940 there were twenty-three schools for Arabs in Cyrenaica. Some of these were in centres within reach of Bedouin and a number of medical clinics were also opened in Bedouin areas. Less use was made of the schools than of the clinics.

Thus in every department of public life power and authority were retained by the Italians in their own hands and the people of the country had no representation in the Government and were not consulted about plans for their future. It was, however, necessary for the Italians to employ a number of Arabs in minor administrative posts, because they could not themselves make contact with the people, and in the Islamic courts, where they could not themselves function. After 1935, when Italy

¹ Dr. R. Micacchi, 'L'Instruction publique en Libye de 1912 à 1924', *Institut Colonial International*, 1926, and 'L'Enseignement aux indigènes dans les colonies italiennes dépendant directement de la Couronne', *ibid.* 1931.

175*
648*

175*
648*
563 •

[13]

*175 found herself in none too friendly a world with the added cares
*648 of an imperial power, efforts were made to identify more closely
● 563 with Italian interests those of the better-educated section of the
Arab population through this bureaucratic *élite*. If it was to
be an asset in the future it would have to be given a larger stake
in the administration of the country. Balbo emphasized this
requirement in his plan of development. He said in 1938 that
he wished to raise the cultural and social level of the Arabs by
allowing them to collaborate in greater numbers and more
positively in public offices and duties. If such collaboration was
still limited and the participation of Arabs in posts of responsi-
bility was still rare it was due 'to the poverty of capable and
reliable elements, and certainly not to an obstinate prejudice
on the part of the Government'.¹

This *élite* had to be very small to begin with, for suitable
material was, as Balbo wrote in the passage quoted above, hard
to find in Cyrenaica. Excluding persons employed in such
menial offices as sweepers, door-keepers, and office messengers,
and the large numbers of Cyrenaicans in the army and police
under Italian officers and N.C.O.s, there were in 1940 only
about 150 Arabs employed in the Civil Service. About 100
of these were administrative officials, advisers, mudirs, and
sub-mudirs, and the rest were religious functionaries, qadis
and officials of the religious courts. The administrative
officials had no real authority, their duties being limited to
collecting information about the Arab population and circulat-
ing among it the instructions of the Government. They were
treated as servants in the domestic rather than in the public
sense and they were ill-paid. Nevertheless, through their many
social contacts with their fellow countrymen they exercised
more influence than the Italians would have wished, and the
Italians were, owing to their ignorance of Arabic and of Arab
ways of life and thought, very largely in their hands. They
undoubtedly deceived their masters to their own advantage and
in the interests of their fellow countrymen. These Arab bureau-
crats were townsmen, mostly from Banghazi and Darna. Some
were members of respectable urban families of Turkish days,
such as the Banghazi families of Bin 'Amir, Bsaikri, Biju, and
'Anaisi, and the Darna families of Bannani, Darbi, Dillal, and

¹ Italo Balbo, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

ITALIAN RULE AND COLONIZATION

207

Jarbi, and had been educated in Turco-Arab schools in the country, and a few at Istanbul. Most, however, were less reputable and had a record of close and active collaboration with the Italians as informers, spies, guides, interpreters, leaders of 'friendlies', and overseers in concentration camps. When the fighting was over the Italians felt under an obligation to these men, their only friends in the country, and rewarded them with administrative posts for which they had few qualifications. It is not surprising that later they often found them an embarrassment and had to admit that the Bedouin for preference avoided their company. Before the last European war they were being slowly replaced by a new class of officials brought up in the towns under Italian rule and educated in Italo-Arab schools. These *évolués* showed a marked preoccupation with their own affairs and little inclination to use their superior education for the benefit of their own people in the towns, while their repugnance to the Bedouin made them regard a posting to one of the country districts as a punishment. But if they had no strong sense of loyalty to their own people they likewise had none to their masters. They might join Fascist clubs and syndics and apply for special Italian citizenship but they did so passively, without conviction that these things would mean more to them than payment of subscriptions. They knew moreover that the swarms of Italian immigrants settling like locusts on Cyrenaica would spell disaster to them no less than to the rest of the Arab population. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that during the late war the Italians watched them closely for *disfattismo politico*, and not without cause, for they showed themselves very ready to co-operate with the British during their first two occupations of Cyrenaica, and some, including ten senior officials, showed themselves so openly anti-Italian during these periods that they thought it wise to retire with the British forces in their second retreat to Egypt. 175* 648* 563 •

The Bedouin accepted all these Italian measures, good and bad, with resignation and indifference. They were powerless to oppose them, but as far as possible they ignored them. Plagued with concentration camps, loss of stock, confiscation of arms, rape of sowing and pasture grounds, the pass system, corrupt officials, and neglect of their Shaikhs, they found the odd mosque, school, and clinic poor consolation and retired [67]

ITALIAN RULE AND COLONIZATION

215

tary command of the Sahara. The other Articles of the 1934 decree were designed chiefly to meet the new conditions arising, or likely to arise, from colonization by nationals. In no important respect did it alter the status of the Arab population or what rights it still possessed. In the first enthusiasm of turning Libya into a metropolitan colony the Arabs were of secondary interest to those who made the laws. 175* 648*

In view of the coming struggle between the powers of Europe, already seen by Mussolini to be inevitable, the Italian Government considered it advisable to pay more attention to the feelings of its colonists and native peoples. To encourage the colonists already in the country and those about to join them from Italy a Royal Decree was promulgated on 9 January 1939 declaring Libya to be an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, its four provinces becoming the ninety-seventh, ninety-eighth, ninety-ninth, and hundredth provinces of the Kingdom. The military status of the Libyan Sahara remained unchanged. The colonists no longer had to feel that they had left their fatherland for inhospitable shores. The *Colonia* had become *Terra Italiana*. The *Quarta Sponda*, Italy's Fourth Shore, had become a political fact. At the same time, to quiet any uneasiness which the incorporation of their country in the Kingdom of Italy might create among those educated Arabs whose services the Italians needed, and to implement the promise Mussolini had made during his tour of Libya in 1937 that he would remember the part played by Libyan volunteers in the Ethiopian campaign, the Decree offered the Arabs a new special citizenship which took the place of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship allowed in the earlier decrees and now abrogated. That the Italians had attached importance to the partial assimilation of a small *élite* of natives is shown by the retention of the right of acquiring metropolitan citizenship through all the decrees and laws, from the invasion of Libya in 1911 till the present decree, in both pre-Fascist and Fascist times. It had been found, however, that the Arabs had not availed themselves of the privilege. Employees of the administration could not feel that any advantages they might derive from it could compensate them for loss of status before the religious courts in matters of personal law, a loss considered shameful even by whole-hearted collaborators. Also, the new special citizenship, 175* 648* 167 641 563 •

*175 *cittadinanza italiana speciale*, was more in accordance with
*648 Balbo's policy of parallel development than acquisition of
641 metropolitan citizenship.

- 563 The new special citizenship could be acquired, without prejudice to Muslim personal law, by persons who had reached the age of eighteen, provided they had a good record and had in some way or other served the State or could read and write Italian. The status carried with it certain privileges: the right to bear arms, the right to be inscribed in the Arab Blackshirt Organization, the right to a military career in Libyan units (now withdrawn from other Libyans), the right to become mayor in Arab communities and adviser in mixed Italo-Arab communities, and the right to come under the *Ordinamento sindacale-corporativo*, an ordinance by which the Fascist guild system had been adapted to suit colonial conditions, and to take some part in the activities of these guilds. These rights could be exercised only in Italian African territories and no Arab could, in any case, occupy posts or practise professions which would necessitate Italians serving under him.

The reception of the new decree by the colonists and by Arab employees of the Administration was enthusiastic. It may be doubted, however, whether the sentiments expressed by the mudirs, the qadis, and some of the richer merchants, in the telegrams of thanks they sent to Mussolini and Balbo were felt. It was tacitly assumed to be a condition of continued employment that special citizenship should be applied for. The first batch of diplomas included ninety Cyrenaican names, almost all of native officials and government pensioners of the urban centres: the decree could not have been of the slightest interest to the Bedouin. Conscription for military service followed shortly afterwards. Of their bounty the Italians had given to the Arabs of Cyrenaica a *Patria*, *l'Italia Fascista*, and they were expected to show their gratitude by fighting for it. On 10 June 1940 Italy entered the war on the side of Germany.

Thus in 1911 the Arabs of Cyrenaica became enemy subjects and were afterwards declared to be Italian subjects. In 1919 they became Italian citizens. When the Italians renewed operations against them in 1923 those who resisted were declared to be *ribelli*. Under the Fascists they lost the Italian citizenship they had been granted under the democratic régime of 1919 and

ITALIAN RULE AND COLONIZATION

217

became instead Italian-Libyan citizens. In 1939 they were granted the privilege of applying, if they had the necessary qualifications, for a special Italian citizenship, a status half-way between that of the ordinary Arab of the country and that of the Italian colonists. There were, therefore, in Cyrenaica in 1940 three categories of citizenship, that of the *cittadini metropolitani*, Italian settlers and officials, that of the *cittadini italiani speciali*, a small intermediate urban class of educated Arab officials, and that of the *cittadini italiani libici (musulmani)*, which comprised almost the entire native population of the country. These changes in the civil status of the Arabs were to a considerable extent a response to the development of the political situation in Cyrenaica itself. The Royal Decree of 1913 was an optimistic anticipation of easy victory; the Royal Decree of 1919 was an acknowledgement of political and military failure; the Royal Decree of 1927 was a sign that apathy and compromise had given way to determination to fight the Bedouin if necessary, and even by preference, to the point of extermination; the Royal Decree of 1934 marked the end of all resistance and envisaged the settlement of Italian colonists on the best lands of the country; and the Royal Decree of 1939 signalled the realization of this programme and at the same time made a bid for co-operation of the Arab intelligentsia. But to an equal extent the changes in civil status were determined by political events in Italy and in Europe. The Royal Decree of 1913 was a plain colonial declaration such as any European Power would have made in similar circumstances. In 1919 Italian politics were defeatist, demagogic, socialist, and internationalist, and the Royal Decree of that year was a stew of these ingredients. The Royal Decrees of 1927 and 1934 were typical Fascist pieces of legislation with emphasis on State requirements rather than on citizenship and the rights of the individual, and showed a strong bias towards bureaucratic centralization and hypertrophy. The Royal Decree of 1939 bore the stamp of empire.

IV

The Bedouin were altogether unimpressed either by Italian propaganda or by their social services, and they did not believe in their promises of future benefits. 'Bukra al-'id', 'The feast

ITALIAN RULE AND COLONIZATION

225

tions and gardens. On the other hand, it was recognized that if they were to be able to lead a nomadic life at all, and they had to do so if they were to rear their animals, they must have access to water-supplies and grazing-grounds, and that this would sometimes mean their crossing the plateau through the area of Italian colonization. To solve this problem corridors running north and south across the plateau were, as explained in an earlier section, marked out for the transit of Bedouin flocks and herds. [175* 648* 423 233 (487)]

It was envisaged that the Bedouin would continue to lead a predominantly pastoral life on the more rugged parts of the first terrace of the plateau, on its southern slopes, and in the steppe country of the *sirwal*, the *barga*, the Marmarica, and the Sirtica. It was thought that they had in these areas all the land they needed for grazing and catch-crop cultivation, though it was evident that in years of drought they could not have managed to survive without summer grazing on the plateau. Nevertheless, efforts were made to raise the economic level of the Bedouin by improving their methods of cultivation and stock-raising so that, as both producers and labourers, they might be more valuable an adjunct to Italian husbandry, and might become more dependent on the State and more closely linked with metropolitan activities. It was intended that they should constitute a cheap reserve of labour for general unskilled work and for seasonal labour on the farms of the colonists. By using them in this way it was hoped that it would be possible to avoid the growth of a metropolitan proletariat.¹ These efforts included, largely for political reasons, the creation of Arab colonization centres. Agricultural villages and farms were to be built by the *Ente* similar to, but smaller than, those built for the Italian immigrants. The first two such villages, Fiorita and Alba, were built in 1939. Each Arab farming family was provided with a house, a well, a camel, a cow, and farm implements. Like the Italian, the Arab colonist was to be first salaried labourer, then partner with the State, then mortgagor, and finally owner. As only thirty-two holdings were prepared at Fiorita and Alba the contribution to native agriculture cannot be regarded as more than a token one. Moreover, the Italians experienced difficulty in finding Arab colonists for even these [175* 648* 511 (464)]

175*
648*
167
563 •

¹ Ibid., p. 622.

ITALIAN RULE AND COLONIZATION

*175 thirty-two holdings, for the Bedouin showed no inclination to
*648 work as serfs the lands they had worked as freemen: 'In their
[167] daily attitude coldness and scepticism were apparent so that
[563] the part they took in collaborating was purely formal.'¹ A
pastoral village, furnished with veterinary and stud services and
offices for the collection, classification, and weighing of wool,
was built at Nahibā (Jardis al-'Abid) and another was planned
to be built at Verde (Jardis al-Jarrari). Some may consider that
these measures are evidence of Balbo's sincerity. The Bedouin
believed that he intended to destroy them by guile as surely as
Graziani had destroyed them with machine-gun and bomb.

V

When Giolitti landed troops in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in
1911 he started his country on the road to ruin. The first
Libyan war was from 1911 to 1917. In the midst of it Italy was
involved, from 1915 to 1918, in the first Great War. From 1921
to 1932 she was again engaged in prosecuting her colonial war
in Libya, first in Tripolitania, then in Cyrenaica also. From
1934 to 1936 she participated in the Spanish civil war. In 1935
and 1936 she conquered Ethiopia. In 1939 she seized Albania.
From 1940 to 1944 she was engaged in the second Great War.
It was appropriate that disaster should overcome the Italians
in Cyrenaica, that the Bedouin of that country who had suffered
so much at their hands should witness their humiliation, and
that it should fall on the head of Graziani, who became Governor
of Libya when Balbo was killed at Tubruq on 28 June 1940.

As the day of retribution drew near the Italians showed some
uneasiness about the situation in Cyrenaica and, as I have
recorded, they made belated attempts to conciliate the Arabs.
*175 Their uneasiness was partly due to the presence of the Sanusi
*648 leader Sayyid Idris and of a number of notable Cyrenaican and
*795 Tripolitanian Shaikhs in exile in Egypt. It could hardly be
793 doubted that they would approach the British with offers of
assistance should Italy enter the war on the side of Germany.
This is what happened. In October 1939, when Italy's parti-
cipation seemed imminent, the Cyrenaican and Tripolitanian

[113] ¹ Giuseppe Palloni, *The Action of the Italian Government in Favour of the
Libyan Agriculture*, 1945, p. 31.